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A feature of the People-Centered
Development Forum
Release Date November 24, 1990
NGO STRATEGIC NETWORKS: FROM COMMUNITY
PROJECTS TO GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION
by
David C. Korten
In
March 1988, ANGOC held a landmark workshop in this conference
room on the theme of NGO Strategic Management. The workshop
focused on what was then the cutting edge issue for Asian NGOs,
the movement beyond village level projects to a concern with
focusing the NGO's resources on clearly defined objectives to
leverage national scale change. We identified democratization
as a unifying concern of NGO action across Asia. We addressed
the need for coalition building at national and subnational
levels to combine resources within the NGO sector toward the
definition and pursuit of a shared vision of national development.
The
intervening period has been a time of dramatic change for NGOs
in Asia as elsewhere. As we broaden our perspectives we realize
that the deepening poverty, environmental devastation, and violence
we see in the villages where we work are not local phenomena.
They are pervasive and global the result of systemic forces
that cannot be resolved by action at the village level alone.
This awareness helps us to put our work in perspective.
A
SELF-DESTRUCTIVE VISION OF HUMAN PROGRESS
Contrary
to its promise, economic growth is not alleviating the conditions
that define the unfolding global crisis. Indeed there is reason
to believe that it is the single minded pursuit of growth that
is the cause. We face a dilemma. It has become an article of
faith among much of the world's population that economic growth
is the key to universal prosperity. People, the world over,
expect their leaders to provide it. As the crisis places ever
increasing pressures on them, these same leaders, who seldom
have time for serious reflection, become increasingly obsessed
with the need to take whatever action promises to add to national
output statistics in the current year and to fight any action
that threatens them. They fail to see that their actions only
add to the crisis not to its resolution.
The
favored short-run policies lead to the concentration of ever
greater economic power in the hands of the state and/or large
corporate enterprise, each of which is in turn evaluated by
society primarily on the basis of its contributions to economic
output. In the pursuit of this mandate, these institutions seek
ever greater control over economic resources, which they mine
with an eye only to today's bottom line usually at the expense
of those who are too weak to protect themselves. The greed of
the wealthy is indulged while the poor and future generations
are deprived of the means of meeting their basic needs and reduced
to a struggle for economic survival and stripped of their basic
sense of humanity and community. Poverty, environmental destruction,
and the communal violence that results from a breakdown of the
social fabric are all a direct consequence.
Contrary
to prevailing belief, our world is divided not between the developed
and the underdeveloped, but rather between the over- and underconsumers
of earth's available resources. Because these resources are
finite and because total current consumption is at or beyond
the ability of earth's ecosystem to sustain, we are forced to
acknowledge that there is a direct link between the behavior
of the overconsumers and the plight of the underconsumers. The
despair of the latter cannot be overcome without curbing the
greed of the former. The answer lies not in growth, but in a
transformation of the values and institutions that define how
we use earth's bounty and distribute its benefits.
Human
society is locked into a mind-set that places it on a collision
course with the limits of a finite planet and the psychological
and social tolerance of its own members. The task before us
is one of breaking humanity out of this pattern of collective
self-destruction. This task takes us far beyond the traditional
role of assisting the poor through village based development
projects. It requires new ways of working and thinking, new
organizational relationships, new strategies, and new skills.
MOVEMENTS AND NETWORKS: HOW PEOPLE CHANGE UNRESPONSIVE INSTITUTIONS
The
small size and limited financial resources of most NGOs make
them unlikely challengers of economic and political systems
sustained by the prevailing interests of big government and
big business. Yet the environment, peace, human rights, consumer
rights and women's movements provide convincing examples of
the power of voluntary action to change society. This seeming
paradox can be explained by the fact that the power of voluntary
action arises not from the size and resources of individual
voluntary organizations, but rather from the ability of the
voluntary sector to coalesce the actions of hundreds, thousands,
or even millions of citizens through vast and constantly evolving
networks that commonly lack identifiable structures, embrace
many chaotic and conflicting tendencies, and yet act as if in
concert to create new political and institutional realities.
These networks are able to encircle, infiltrate, and even co-opt
the resources of opposing bureaucracies. They reach across sectors
to intellectuals, press, community organizations. Once organized,
they can, through electronic communications, rapidly mobilize
significant political forces on a global scale.
Engaging
in such processes is a new experience for most development oriented
NGOs. Yet in growing numbers they are joining forces with and
learning from the experience of established social movements.
As we learn more about the nature of true movements, we realize
that they are not defined by organizational structures. They
are characterized by values-driven action oriented flows of
voluntary social energy given shape and direction by a broadly
shared social vision. Participation is driven by value commitments
rather than by anticipation of financial or political rewards.
As
our understanding grows, we see that strategic networks are
the building blocks of social movements. A strategic network
is a temporary alliance of individuals and organizations through
which their resources are combined in pursuit of shared, defined
and consequential goals that strengthen the movement's position
in relation to major opposing forces. These alliances commonly
reach beyond the formal voluntary sector to engage students,
media, universities, agencies of government, and responsible
business organizations. In many instances they link local, national,
and international groups.
Many
of the participants in a strategic network may be acting on
the basis of an immediate agenda or interest without perceiving
themselves to be part of a larger social movement. As is true
for the larger movement of which strategic networks are a part,
each network may itself be comprised of countless shifting tactical
networks formed around narrower agendas that contribute to the
larger strategic objective.
While
the success of strategic networks commonly depends on their
ability to energize spontaneous voluntary action on a considerable
scale, they are seldom in themselves spontaneous creations.
Usually one or more individuals or organizations assume critical
and highly self-conscious roles as strategic network catalysts
in their creation, maintenance, and direction. NGO experiences
in the region provide rich insights into the nature of this
role.
CASE
OF THE NAM CHOAN DAM
In
Thailand, the campaign against the Nam Choan Dam, which would
have displaced thousands of people and destroyed a major wildlife
sanctuary, is an example of a successful strategic network that
is especially helpful in understanding the role of the strategic
network catalyst. One of the organizations that played such
a role in this campaign was the Project for Ecological Recovery
(PER), a small Thai environmental NGO with ten paid staff members
and an annual budget of less than US$35,000. This tiny organization
forged an alliance among thirty-eight grassroots organizations
in the threatened area, student organizations, conservationists,
and mass media in Thailand, and an international network of
environmental organizations and journalists. The alliance ultimately
convinced the government to cancel the project.
In
the course of this campaign PER organized countless meetings
and seminars, talked with representatives of government, helped
keep all the groups in contact with one another from day to
day, organized visits to the dam site by citizen groups from
Bangkok and abroad, acted as a clearinghouse for technical and
campaign information, engaged the media, and worked constantly
to broaden the campaign's tactics and base of public support.
Each
participating group had its own reasons for being engaged. PER
recognized and accepted their differing motivations and helped
each to find a role within the larger coalition consistent with
its particular commitment and strategic resources. Each group
was encouraged to tell its own story from its own perspective,
with PER helping each to project the messages to those elements
of the public most likely to be sympathetic to its particular
appeal.
- The local people faced the destruction
of their homes and livelihoods. They were fighting for their
immediate self-interest. PER made them the foundation of the
campaign. Rather than attempting to form new community groups,
it worked with whatever groups already existed: traditional
councils, housewife groups and village scouts. It encouraged
different grassroots groups to meet with one another to share
concerns, develop joint tactics, and form an association all
the while working with existing structures and forces and
keeping its own role to a minimum. The local groups staged
marches, submitted petitions, applied pressure on their elected
representatives, and hosted visiting delegations.
- The students, who represented
a leftist perspective, saw the dam as an effort to benefit
industrial interests at the expense of the rural poor and
engaged themselves in what they saw as a battle of class interests.
They arranged demonstrations and publicity events that sometimes
involved direct confrontations with government.
- The environmentalists, generally
intellectuals and public figures of a more conservative political
orientation, were primarily concerned with the preservation
of a unique forest. They were encouraged to analyze the environmental
dangers and social costs in public forums and press conferences.
Mutual suspicion of one another's motives between this group
and the students, led PER to work with each group separately
in its own language rather than trying to bring them together
for joint strategizing.
- The journalists and film makers
were engaged through seminars, press releases, site visits,
and letter writing campaigns as professionals whose role is
to keep the public informed on important issues. They disseminated
information about the uniqueness of the area to audiences
in Thailand and abroad and publicized the consequences of
the project for people who lived in the area.
The
PER's mode of working is quite different from that of more typical
development oriented NGOs. For example,
- It maintains a low profile,
never using its own name, always projecting the image of other
groups and highlighting their commitment to the cause.
- It does not takes on any function
that another group can perform, confining itself to facilitating
linkages and filling temporary gaps not serviced by other
organizations.
- It does not funds local groups,
preferring to strengthen their self-reliance by helping them
plan and carry out their own fund raising events, such as
rock concerts.1
- It does not publish a newsletter.
When communicating with a particular constituency it uses
that group's newsletters. When it wants to get a message out
to the public, it uses the mass media. Thus it reaches a far
larger audience at a fraction of the cost.
- It keeps itself small and its
budget modest, working by activating, enabling, amplifying,
and focusing existing social forces. It lives by the logic
that big organizations have to take on large conventional
projects to justify themselves. They necessarily become competitors
with other organizations and interests rather than facilitators
who measure their own success by their effectiveness in helping
others to be strong and successful.
PER's
experience suggests a number of useful operating principles
for organizations that serve as strategic network catalysts.
(See the box insert on the following page.)
Operating Principles for Strategic Network Catalysts
1.
Maintain a low public profile. Emphasize the commitment and
contribution of other organizations to the network's goals.
Measure own success by effectiveness in making others stronger
and more successful contributors to these goals.
2.
Recognize the differing motivations and resources of the groups
engaged in the network.
3.
Look to those who have the most direct and compelling interest
in the outcome to provide the sustained leadership.
4.
Continuously scan the environment for opportunities to engage
new participants who bring new perspectives and may appeal to
additional segments of the public.
5.
Do no take on any function that another group can perform. Facilitate
linkages and fill temporary gaps not serviced by other organizations.
6.
Work through existing communication networks and media to reach
large audiences efficiently.
7.
Help other groups find their own sources of funds, but don't
become a funder.
8.
Keep staff and budget small to assure flexibility, avoid competing
institutional interests, and maintain dependence on the effective
action of others.
9.
Use protest actions to position the movement to advance a proactive
agenda.
PER's
experience with a variety of campaigns against socially and
environmentally harmful development projects has led it to the
conclusion that attacking ill conceived projects is not enough.
It now realizes that the government's need for dams stems from
ill conceived development policies that fail to account adequately
for their residual social and environmental costs.It must put
forward credible alternatives. For example, the dam projects
that PER has successfully fought are being put forward by a
government desperately seeking ways to meet the projected demand
for energy, driven by Thailand's export-led industrialization
strategy. There is need not only for an alternative energy policy
that emphasizes energy conservation and efficiency, but also
an alternative development policy that points to ways to enhance
the well-being of the Thai people without significant dependence
on large new centralized power generation facilities.
Producing and presenting credible alternatives poses a serious
new challenge to PER. Government, business and existing technocratic
think-tanks are all committed to established concepts of development.
PER thus sees a need to develop its own research capacity as
it redefines its role from one of resisting harmful development
projects on a case by case basis to one of formulating and popularizing
well thought out and documented alternatives more beneficial
to the long-term interests of Thailand's people.
NGO
THEORY OF POVERTY: FROM BASIC NEEDS TO DEVELOPMENT VISION
Tim
Brodhead says that to be a development organization it is essential
to have a theory of poverty that directs us to its underlying
causes. Without such a theory the organization inevitably remains
a relief and welfare agency, responding only to poverty's most
evident symptoms.
Indeed
many NGOs concerned with the plight of the poor did begin as
relief and welfare organizations, and many remain so today.
They see that people are unable to meet their basic needs and,
without asking why, respond in the most direct and immediate
way by providing food, clothing, health care, and shelter as
required. They engage in first generation strategies.
The
more thoughtful NGOs at some point find themselves asking, "Why
are these people poor." They began, at least implicitly,
to formulate a theory of poverty. They attempt to "look
upstream," searching for the source or cause of the problem.
Many NGOs that pursue this question conclude that the problem
is local inertia, a sort of self-imposed and by implication
self-correctable powerlessness resulting from lack of organization,
political consciousness, belief in self, credit, and basic skills.
Armed with an action theory that suggests this inertia can be
broken through appropriate external interventions, they set
about to intervene with community development programs. They
reorient themselves to second generation strategies.
When
the theory of community inertia proved to be inadequate, some
of us looked further upstream. This led to a realization that
in large measure the evident powerlessness of the villager is
not self-imposed. Rather it is externally-imposed and sustained
by policies and programs, often originating from the state and
funded by foreign agencies, that deprive the poor of access
to productive resources and maintain them in a state of dependency.
Development projects, such as dams and industrial forest plantations,
that displace the poor from their homes and means of livelihood
are among the most obvious examples. Some NGOs have adjusted
their theories accordingly and set about to advocate for changes
in critical policies and to work with government through partnerships
aimed at reorienting its programs in ways that strengthened
local control and initiative. They moved to third generation
strategies.
NGOs
are now taking another look still further upstream. What they
see is deeply disturbing, i.e., many of the most devastating
programs and policies are a direct consequence of the way human
society has come to define development itself. They are imbedded
in a growth-centered development vision and in the institutions
that we have collectively created to pursue it. We are now looking
at the most fundamental driving forces of the global system
and coming to realize the extent to which the poverty, environmental
destruction, and communal violence experienced in the villages
of Asia are symptoms of forces that have locked human society
onto a self-destructive path that ultimately threatens the very
survival of human civilization.
Many
NGOs have become expert in consciousness raising at the village
level. They defined the problem as one of an inappropriate mind-set.
Now we see that though the problem was correctly defined, its
scope was seriously underestimated. Consciousness change is
essential, but not only for the poor villager. It must be universal,
including the power holders of global society.
As
we reflect on the events of the past few years, we will see
that we have been engaged in a continuous process of what Hazel
Henderson calls "upstreaming," reaching beyond the
evident consequences of the problem at hand to address its source.
We are finding that this is not a simple matter. Each time we
move "upstream" we find the issues are more complex
and the vested interests more powerful. We feel less confident
in our traditional skills and face needs to create ever wider
networks. We are led into increasing involvement with the global
context of our national political and economic systems and pulled
into ever larger and more complex international coalitions.
To
achieve changes of the scope and magnitude required, it is necessary
to think of the NGO's people-centered development alternative
not as a village project, but as a global people's movement
for social transformation. The strategic networks we will be
examining this week are among the countless such initiatives
that are giving this movement it's vitality and direction. They
represent, however, only a bare beginning. On a global scale
thousands more are needed, each with their own catalysts. Hopefully
our deliberations will lead us to insights into how they may
be developed more rapidly and effectively.
ISSUES
There
are a number of basic issues to be addressed by those of us
who chose to define our roles as catalysts in the formation
and guidance of strategic networks as elements of a larger movement
for global social transformation.
--
From protest to proaction. Engaging major constituencies in
protest can make an important contribution to strengthening
awareness of issues and building commitment to activism. Protest
is relatively easy to organize as it is usually easier to build
consensus about what should not be done than about what constitutes
a positive alternative. At the same time protest actions only
pose barriers to the negative forces of the growth-centered
development vision. Even when successful, they do not resolve
them.
Eventually there must be attention to building support for a
proactive agenda aimed at transformational change. The question
should be continuously in mind: What do we want in place of
what we cannot accept? Each protest action should be consciously
designed to lead toward defining such alternatives and building
supporting constituencies. Perhaps we might explore during this
meeting how this can be accomplished, and how the strategies
and tactics of strategic networks engaged in protest actions
differ from those working for proactive outcomes.
--
Building Citizen Democracy. Democratization is a key theme of
NGO activity throughout Asia. We have learned, however, that
the institutional forms of democratic governance are in themselves
little more than empty shells. They provide citizens with the
means to engage in the governance process, but they cannot insure
that they will be used. Unused, they will inevitably be abused
by those in power. Our experience is leading us to the realization
that "democracy is not something we have; it is something
we do."2 Democracy cannot exist without citizen action.
Democratization is best thought of as a process of building
capacities for and commitment to citizen action through action.
The traditional organization building agenda of NGOs is a part
of this process, but only a part. Strategic networks are another.
Single organizations are rarely successful in taking on significant
policy and institutional change agendas acting entirely on their
own. Where the issues involve significant external political
and economic forces, strategic networking becomes an essential
mode of action.
Strategic networks are important training grounds, as well as
instruments of, citizen democracy and should be treated as such.
Strategic networking can also contribute to the essential process
of rebuilding a sense of community, recreating the social structures
based on shared values that modern society with its emphasis
on impersonal market transactions and hierarchical organizations
has disrupted. The are a means of helping to break the feelings
of alienation powerlessness that this disruption has left behind.
In
a vital democratic system, an individual person or organization
may be engaged simultaneously in a number of strategic networks
that involve different agendas and different combinations of
actors. Citizen democracy grows out of the thickening web of
active networks that form around a growing number of needs and
issues.
Each
strategic network effort should seek consciously to leave behind
a more informed and active citizenry with a strengthened sense
of being part of a local, national, and global community of
caring citizens. Though networking links are often temporary
and ephemeral, each time a link dissolves, there should be left
behind a positive memory trace that will make new linkages easier
to form toward the solution of new problems.
--
Forming Alliances Across Social Movements. The NGOs concerned
with poverty or social justice present an exceedingly weak force
in the face of the transformation agenda. Remaining isolated
and even competitive with one another and focusing almost exclusively
on micro-level interventions it may be stretching the meaning
of the term to call them a movement.3 Fortunately, many of them
are moving quickly beyond their traditional limitations and
are learning the ways of strategic networking, often through
alliances with organizations from movements more experienced
in that mode of action.
We
are coming to realize that the people-centered development or
social transformation movement is in fact a meta-movement that
embraces the proactive agendas of many existing social movements,
including the environment, human rights, peace, women's, social
justice, and consumer protection movements. The meta-movement
will emerge as a truly significant force for change only as
the participants in its component movements come to recognize
the extent to which the realization of their own agendas depend
ultimately on achievement of the larger transformational agenda.
A number of the strategic networking cases to be discussed in
this meeting involve actions that join the interests of two
or more of the component movements. Links between the environment,
human rights, and social justice movements seem to be particularly
common. Encouraging and strengthening these tendencies seems
a desirable course of action. We might look for insights from
the cases as to how this can be achieved.
--
Distinguishing Between Activist and Service Provider NGOs. There
has been a considerable tendency to group together all NGOs
concerned with the needs of the poor into a single category.
They join the same coalition bodies, have the same kinds of
registration, use the same terms to identify themselves, attend
the same training programs, often seek funds from the same donors,
etc. But are they the same?
While
still too early to say for sure, there are indications that
we may be seeing a somewhat permanent division among such NGOs
between those that chose to be specialized service providers
(elsewhere described as public service contractors)4 and those
that chose to be social activists working in more catalytic
roles. These two roles require fundamentally different skills
and orientations.
Service
providers have a natural, and probably appropriate, tendency
to grow in size and service area and are more likely to have
hierarchical organizational forms. Their activities feature
routine modes of working and they are likely to shy from controversies
that might prove offensive to the donors on which their survival
depends.
The
activist organizations are likely to have a smaller staff, though
they may have large membership bodies organized around decentralized
local chapters. They will also tend toward looser, more decentralized
structures. Very little of what they do could be considered
routine. They are constantly facing new challenges. They may
not seek political controversy, but are forced to accept it
as part of the territory. Their funding is likely to be fairly
precarious and they are more likely to depend on voluntary contributions
of funds and time.
The
above distinctions are based more on a theoretical analysis
of differences inherent in the tasks of the service provider
and the activist than on an examination of actual experience.
As we examine the cases to be presented in this workshop, we
might be looking for answers to questions such as the following:
What are the characteristics of effective strategic network
catalysts? To what extent have organizations with a consequential
service delivery program been effective in this role? Can these
organizations be effective network participants in other than
the catalyst role? What are the implications? To what extent
do the activists organizations feel compelled to look and act
like service provider organizations in order to attract funding
and maintain their necessary acceptability to government? Is
it productive to blur the distinctions between the activists
and the service providers? Or does the lack of a clear distinction
hinder our ability both to develop effective national service
delivery systems and effective forums for the practice of citizen
democracy?
NGOs
no longer enjoy the luxury of being inconsequential actors at
the periphery of the development stage. Our choices make a serious
difference to the global future. We must take our responsibilities
seriously and prepare ourselves accordingly. We are only beginning
to understand the nature of strategic networks and the critical
roles of the catalysts that give them shape and direction. We
must make rapid advances in that understanding, in the development
of our skills as effective catalysts, and in sharing our insights
with others who might assume similar roles.
David
C. Korten is President of the People-Centered Development Forum
and a Senior Associate of the Institute for Development Research.
The People-Centered Development Forum is dedicated to advancing
a people's development movement toward the realization of a
people-centered development vision. This paper was prepared
for the Asian Regional Workshop on Strategic Networking for
Sustainable Development and Environmental Action, 26-30 November
1990, Bangkok, Thailand sponsored by the Asian NGO Coalition,
the Institute for Development Research, the International Union
of Consumer Organizations, and the People-Centered Development
Forum. People-Centered Development Forum, MCC P.O. Box 740,
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines.
David
C. Korten
PCDForum -- Localize Economies! Globalize Consciousness!
Fax (212) 242-1901
Comments and suggestions to:
toyinakpan@yahoo.com
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